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I review a number of fMRI studies that investigate the effects of repeating faces on re-
sponses in the fusiform face area (FFA). These studies show that repetition suppression
(RS), as well as repetition enhancement (RE), are sensitive to multiple factors, including
pre-existing stimulus representations, cognitive task, lag between repetitions and spatial
attention. Parallel EEG studies provide additional constraints on the timing of these repe-
tition effects. Together, the results suggest that RS is not a unitary phenomenon, but likely
subsumes multiple mechanisms that operate under different conditions. These mecha-
nisms of course need to relate to single-cell data and known physiological mechanisms;
but to make further progress, I believe we need dynamical neural network models that
relate these mechanisms to the properties of neural populations that are measured by fMRI
and EEG data. One example model is sketched, in which RS reflects an acceleration of
neural dynamics, owing to reduced prediction error within a recurrent visual processing
hierarchy.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Empirical review
This review is a highly personalised one, but with the
advantage that data can be directly related across experi-
ments by virtue of using the same stimulus sets and analysis
methods. For simplicity, the review will focus on a right mid-
fusiform region that consistently appeared across experi-
ments, and likely corresponds to what has been functionally-
defined as the Fusiform Face Area (FFA, Kanwisher,
McDermott, & Chun, 1997), though it should be remembered
that several other brain regions also show face repetitionof the differences in the
ns of such repetition effe
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lsevier Ltd. This is an opeeffects under various conditions. Where relevant, repetition
effects on event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded in the same
paradigm will also be discussed.
1.1. Setting the scene: across-trial paradigms
Before reviewing the data, it is necessary to describe some of
the key features of the experiments:
1. All the experiments involved randomly-intermixing initial
and repeated presentations of faces across trials. This
intermixingmeans that participants did not knowwhetherbrain's response to initial versus repeated presentation of a face,
cts.
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founding effects of expectancy. This contrastswith designs
that compare blocks with different frequencies of repeti-
tion (e.g., Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001), for which expec-
tation is likely to affect the results (e.g., Summerfield,
Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008).
2. Except where indicated otherwise, the experiments
involved many different faces intervening between repe-
tition of any one face. This might be called “long-lag” or
“delayed” repetition, and avoids low-level effects of sen-
sory adaptation/habituation/iconic memory, which likely
affect immediate repetition of the same visual stimulus.
The associated temporal lag between presentations was
typically several minutes. This choice is not because
shorter-lived repetition effects are not interesting or
important, but a consequence of the original theoretical
interest in implicit memory (priming) that can operate over
much longer time-scales.
3. With the exception of the masked priming experiment
below, faces were presented for several hundred msec
(<1 sec), and the brain's response modelled as a brief im-
pulse. It is possible that interesting neural dynamics occur
during the period that a face is displayed (including sen-
sory adaptation; e.g., Kar & Krekelberg, 2016), but these
could not be distinguished in the present experiments.
These boundary conditions are important, because they
mean that the RS effects observed below may have quite
different properties and underlying mechanisms to those
observed in other paradigms, particularly those employing
rapid presentations of the same face (for which the term “fMR
adaptation”, Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001, might be better
reserved).
A final point about fMRI analysis: this was done in a voxel-
wise analysis across individuals after normalising their brains
to a common space defined by anatomy. This contrasts than
the alternative approach of defining individual FFAs func-
tionally using a localiser scan (see Friston, Rotshtein, Geng,
Sterzer, & Henson, 2006 vs Saxe, Brett, & Kanwisher, 2006,
for further discussion of pros and cons of localisers). Thus the
present use of the term “FFA” is not strictly correct, and it is
possible that some repetition effects were missed because
different individuals' FFAs had different anatomical locations.
Nonetheless, the repetition effects that were found were
clearly in a mid-fusiform region that responds strongly to
faces, and whose peak MNI coordinates were very close to the
modal FFA coordinates across individuals.
1.2. The excitement of the early years: priming
My journey began because of an interest in implicit memory,
specifically the behavioural phenomenon of priming, whereby
people typically respond faster or more accurately to repeated
stimuli, even if repetition is not relevant to their task, and
(arguably) even if they are unaware of the repetition. In
particular, I was interested in the role of pre-existing repre-
sentations in perceptual priming. This is because some the-
ories assume that priming reflects a reduced threshold, or
residual activity, for re-activating an existing stimulus repre-
sentation (“abstractionist” theories, Tenpenny, 1995). This isconsistent with claims that priming is found for familiar faces
(e.g., famous ones), but not unfamiliar (novel) faces, which has
been attributed to modification of “face representation units”
(Ellis, Young, & Flude, 1990). Other theories however assume
that even the first presentation of a novel stimulus can leave
some form of trace (new representation) that can affect re-
sponses to that stimulus when it is repeated (“episodic” the-
ories, Tenpenny, 1995). Episodic theories can explain why
priming is sometimes found for novel stimuli. This abstrac-
tionist/episodic distinction breaks down on closer inspection,
for example when one considers that novel stimuli can
consist of new combinations of familiar features (Henson,
2003); nonetheless, I wanted to see if the brain's response
differed for the repetition of faces presumed to have pre-
existing representations (familiar/famous faces) versus
those without (unfamiliar/novel faces).
The paradigm used in our first study (Henson, Shallice, &
Dolan, 2000) is shown in Fig. 1A. The paradigm was taken
from the ERP literature on repetition effects, in which the
participant's task was to respond only to pre-specified, infre-
quent targets (in this case, an inverted face). This task ensures
a certain level of attention is required on each trial, but gives
no reason for differential attention to familiar versus unfa-
miliar faces, or to initial versus repeated faces.
A right mid-fusiform region showed a significant interac-
tion between repetition and familiarity, with RS for familiar
faces but the opposite pattern of RE for unfamiliar faces
(Fig. 1B). Both RS and RE decreased with lag between repeti-
tions, and also persisted for up to five presentations (sug-
gesting that repetition of the same image is not sufficient to
make an unfamiliar face equivalent to a famous one; see also
Bonner, Burton & Bruce, 2003). This pattern was replicated,
and also found for familiar versus unfamiliar symbols
(Henson et al., 2000), as well as words versus nonwords in
other brain regions (Henson, 2001). Regardless of detailed ex-
planations, this cross-over interaction suggested that the ef-
fect of repetition is sensitive to the presence or absence of pre-
existing representations. However, this initial excitement was
tempered by subsequent experiments, considered next,
where the task was manipulated.
1.3. The sobering effects of task
In Henson, Shallice, Gorno-Tempini, and Dolan (2002), we
used the same procedure as above, except that participants
performed two different tasks in two different sessions (using
distinct stimulus sets). In the fame-detection (implicit) task,
they decidedwhether each face was famous or not, regardless
of whether it was repeated, whereas in the repetition-
detection (explicit) task, they decided whether it was the
first or second time they had seen that face in the experiment,
regardless of whether it was famous. These two tasks there-
fore orthogonally oriented participants towards either the
familiarity or repetition dimension (Fig. 1C).
The type of task had a dramatic effect on the pattern of
repetition effects across the brain, including the peak FFA
voxel taken from Henson et al. (2000). In the fame-detection
task, RS was observed for familiar faces, but RE was no
longer observed, whereas in the repetition-detection task, no
repetition effects were significant (Fig. 1D). Again, several
Fig. 1 e Effects of face familiarity and task. Paradigm (A) and fMRI FFA results (B) from Henson et al. (2000). F1 ¼ First
presentation of Familiar face; F2 ¼ Second (repeat) presentation of Familiar face; U1 ¼ First presentation of Unfamiliar face;
U2 ¼ Second (repeat) presentation of Unfamiliar face. Paradigm (C) and fMRI FFA results (D) from Henson et al. (2002). Trial
procedure during Phase 1 (E) and Phase 2 (F) and FFA fMRI results (G) from Henson et al. (2003), together with ERP results
from right occipitotemporal (ROT) sensor in Phase 1 (H) and right prefrontal (RPF) sensor in Phase 2 (I). * ¼ significant
difference.
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lesson was that face repetition effects in this paradigm, at
least as measured by fMRI, are not automatic “bottom-up”
effects, but depend on the task-relevance of the faces.
One potential explanation that deserves special mention is
the possibility that RS was the consequence of stimulus-
response (S-R) bindings (Henson, Eckstein, Waszak, Frings, &
Horner, 2014). According to this account, an association is
made between a particular stimulus and a particular response
(e.g., right finger press) after the first presentation, such that
when that stimulus is repeated, the response can be retrieved
directly, without requiring detailed perceptual processing. It is
this curtailment of processing that is hypothesised to lead to
RS in perceptual regions. Using a similar paradigmwith visual
objects, Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie, and Schacter (2004)
found support for this account by showing that RS in fusi-
form cortex was abolished simply by reversing the yes/no
assignment of responses, which prevents the use of S-R
bindings. For the case of Henson et al. (2002), the repetition-
detection task, but not fame-detection task, prevents use of
S-R bindings by virtue of requiring different responses on first
and second presentations. This could therefore explain the
lack of RS in the repetition-detection task, and presence of RS
in the fame-detection task, at least for famous faces.
This possibility is countered by the experiment described
in Henson et al. (2003), in which the task was switched be-
tween the first and second time each face was seen. This
experiment involved two phases. In Phase 1 (Fig. 1E), half of
the familiar and unfamiliar faces were presented for the first
time (together with phase-scrambled faces that allowed
separate assessment of face perception). In Phase 2 (Fig. 1F),
these faces were repeated, together with faces not seen in
Phase 1. Importantly, the task in Phase 1 (symmetry judg-
ment) was largely orthogonal to the task in Phase 2 (male/fe-
male judgment), such that approximately one half of
repetitions involved the same yes or no response, while the
other half involved the opposite response. Thus any effects of
S-R bindings should average out (though see Henson et al.,
2014, for a more nuanced perspective). The FFA results of
comparing repeated versus nonrepeated faces in Phase 2 are
shown in Fig. 1G. The pattern resembled that in the implicit
task of Henson et al. (2002), in that RS was seen for familiar
faces, but no repetition effect reached significance for unfa-
miliar faces. Thus S-R bindings do not appear to explain RS in
FFA, at least for famous faces.
1.4. The need for temporal information
The complex pattern of repetition effects across the above
three studies raised the question of whether the sluggish na-
ture of the BOLD response hides a mixture of distinct neural
repetition effects, operating at different times during the first
few hundred msec after face onset. For example, an early,
“bottom-up” RS effect may be swamped by a later, “top-
down”, task-dependent RE effect (e.g., increased attention
that occurs when repetitions are task-relevant). This promp-
ted me to record brain activity with EEG as well. Fig. 1HeI
shows the ERPs for the same paradigm shown in Fig. 1EeF.
The earliest difference between faces (familiar plus unfa-
miliar) and scrambled faces (“face perception”) started around150 ms over right occipitotemporal sensors (the “N170”,
Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996). However, the
difference between familiar and unfamiliar faces (“face
recognition”) only emerged later, onsetting around 500 ms,
andmaximal over frontal sensors. More importantly, in Phase
2, there was no effect of repetition on the N170 (for either
familiar faces, shown in Fig. 1I, or unfamiliar faces, not
shown). Rather, a repetition effect was only found for familiar
faces (as in the fMRI data), which onset around 300 ms, again
over frontal sensors. The latter most likely reflected more
rapid recognition of familiar faceswhen primed (seen in Phase
1) than unprimed.
The relationship between maximal ERP differences over
the scalp and their underlying cortical generators is always
difficult to determine, though a number of methodological
studies (e.g., Henson, Mouchlianitis, & Friston, 2009) suggest
that right FFA is at least one of the generators of the scalpN170
(others being right occipital face area, OFA, and right superior
temporal sulcus, STS). Therefore the lack of repetition effects
on the N170 suggest that the RS effects in FFA that were seen
(for familiar faces) by fMRI are arising later, possibly after
recurrent input from higher regions in the visual processing
hierarchy, such as anterior temporal or even prefrontal re-
gions (consistent with themore frontal distribution of the ERP
repetition effect from 300 ms onwards). The issue of re-
entrant effects is discussed later, but first we consider the
effect of lag between repetitions.1.5. The dramatic effects of lag
To directly test the effects of lag, we compared immediate
repetitions (with 2.4 sec between face onsets) with delayed
repetitions (withmore than 94 intervening faces; over 225 sec)
that were randomly-intermixed within a single session of a
gender-judgment task (Henson, Ross, Rylands, Vuilleumier, &
Rugg, 2004). For delayed repetition, we again replicated the
interaction between familiarity and repetition in FFA, with RS
for familiar faces, but no significant repetition effect for un-
familiar faces (if anything, a trend for RE; Fig. 2A). For imme-
diate repetition however, we found RS for both familiar and
unfamiliar faces. This can explain why many other studies
found RS (or fMR-adaptation) for unfamiliar faces; theymainly
used short-lags.
Interestingly, ERP data on the same paradigm again
showed no effect of repetition on the N170, even for imme-
diate repetition (though see Caharel, d’Arripe, Ramon,
Jacques, & Rossion, 2009; Ewbank, Smith, Hancock, &
Andrews, 2008). Instead, immediate repetition produced a
modulation that peaked around 250 ms (Fig. 2B), correspond-
ing to the “N250r” discovered by Schweinberger, Huddy, and
Burton (2004). The N250r has also been associated with FFA,
and is generally bigger for famous faces, which is numerically
consistent with fMRI results in Fig. 2A. The earliest effect of
delayed repetition, on the other hand, was a small increase in
a parietal P600-like component from400 to 600ms (whichmay
reflect the same broad positivity maximal over frontal sensors
in Fig. 1I). Though the relationship between the P600/frontal
positivity and FFA is unclear, these findings further support
the general idea that face repetition effects, even from
Fig. 2 e Effects of repetition lag, spatial attention and awareness. fMRI FFA results (A) and right occipitoparietal ERP (B) from
Henson et al. (2004). iF2¼ Immediate Repetition of Familiar face; dU2¼ Delayed repetition of Unfamiliar face, etc. Paradigm
(C) and fMRI FFA results (D) from Henson and Mouchlianitis (2007) (coloured borders not present in experiment). F/F ¼ face
attended on both initial and repeated occurrences; F/f ¼ face attended on initial but not repeated occurrences; f/F ¼ face
attended on repeated but not initial occurrences; f/f ¼ face ignored on both initial and repeated occurrences (likewise for H/
h ¼ houses). Trial procedure (E) and FFA fMRI results (F) from Kouider et al (2009) and ERP results from right occipitoparietal
sensor (G) fromHenson et al (2008). Fu¼ unprimed famous face; Fd¼ famous face primedwith different image; Fs¼ famous
face primed with same image (likewise for Uu/Ud/Us for unfamiliar faces). See Fig. 1 legend for more details.
c o r t e x 8 0 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 7 4e1 8 4178immediate repetition, arise after initial category-specific re-
sponses (N170).
1.6. The importance of attention but not awareness
One important determinant of the size of FFA responses is
attention, and some of the above effects of task may relate todifferential attention to the dimensions of repetition and/or
familiarity. Henson and Mouchlianitis (2007) examined the
role of spatial attention in repetition effects. Participants
fixated centrally while faces and houses were presented on
both sides of fixation (Fig. 2C). They were told to attend left or
right (in different blocks) in order to make a face/house deci-
sion on the attended stimulus. Repetition was manipulated
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sentation were crossed with being attended or ignored on
second presentation. Note that these were unfamiliar faces,
with a relatively short lag of 2e16 intervening trials. Only
when faces were on the attended side for both initial and
repeated presentations was RS observed in FFA. RS was not
significant in any of the other three conditions (nor was RS
observed for houses in FFA, even when houses were attended
on both presentations; Fig. 2D). These data suggest that
attention is necessary to observe RS to faces in FFA.
One can attend to a point in space but still not be aware of a
stimulus presented there, for example when it is presented
briefly between forward and backward masks. In the final
experiment reviewed here, Kouider, Eger, Dolan, and Henson
(2009) used such a sandwich masked paradigm. This
involved a prime face being presented for 33e50 ms, followed
by a backward mask for 33e50 ms, and then a probe face for
700 ms, for which a fame judgment was required (Fig. 2E).
Separate discrimination tests suggested that participant's
awareness of the brief prime was minimal, and repetition
effects remained even when awareness was extrapolated to
zero. The prime and probe were either both famous or both
nonfamous, and either the same image of the same person,
different images of the same person, or two different people
(all previous studies above used the same image of faces). FFA
RS was found for both famous and nonfamous faces, and for
both same and different images of the sameperson (relative to
two different people), suggesting some degree of abstraction
across low-level image properties (Fig. 2F). ERP data on the
same paradigm (Henson, Mouchlianitis, Matthews,& Kouider,
2008) showed a priming-related modulation as early as
100e150 ms post-probe onset, which likely reflects a modu-
lation of the N250r component to the prime, given the 100 ms
between prime and probe onset (Fig. 2G). Themainmessage of
this study however is that, unlike attention, awareness is not
necessary to obtain RS in FFA.
1.7. Summary
The above results suggest that the magnitude of FFA repeti-
tion effects depends on face familiarity, in that RS is consis-
tently greater for familiar than unfamiliar faces in all
experiments, but whether one sees RE or RS for unfamiliar
faces depends on the lag between repetitions. Moreover,
repetition effects are likely to depend on the precise processes
performed on the faces, as normally determined by the task:
When repetition is task-relevant, for example, repetition ef-
fects are likely to be modulated by increased attention to
repeated relative to initial presentations (since repetitions are
likely to be perceived as the “targets”). It is possible that
repetition effects are also modulated by explicit (conscious)
memory for repeats, though the masked priming experiment
showed that awareness in general is not necessary to see FFA
RS. Both initial and repeated presentations of faces do need to
be attended, however, in order to see FFA repetition effects.
These findings have implications for comparing results
across other fMRI studies of RS. For example, the findings of
studies using frequent repetition of faces (e.g., within the
blocked designs often used to investigate perception) are
likely to reflect different mechanisms from those using lessfrequent, longer-lag repetitions (as often used to investigate
memory). One is also likely to see different repetition effects
depending on whether repetitions are relevant (e.g., in the
repetition-detection, “1-back” tasks often used in studies of
perception) versus irrelevant (as in studies of implicit mem-
ory). Finally, RS effects for different types of stimuli, such as
faces versus words, may differ because of different levels of
pre-experimental familiarity, rather than different stimulus
categories per se (Kovacs, Kaiser, Kaliukhovich, Vidnyanszky,
& Vogels, 2013).
Furthermore, the ERP data on the same paradigms above
remind us that fMRIwill conflatemultiple, temporally-distinct
processes that operate within a few hundred msec of each
other. (Likewise, EEG will conflate multiple, spatially-distinct
processes within a few millimetres of each other). This
consideration is relevant to more dynamic perspectives on
repetition effects, as discussed later. First though, we consider
other fMRI studies of RS in FFA to face repetitions.
1.8. Related fMRI studies
The studies reviewed above have used repetition of the same
face image, which raises the possibility that RS arises from
low-level visual representations, e.g., view-specific rather
than identify-specific representations. (Note that low-level
visual adaptation is ruled out by the presence of intervening
faces in most of the above studies, though such adaptation
may contribute to RS for immediate repetitions.) This issue of
view-specificity is particularly relevant to the distinction be-
tween familiar and unfamiliar faces, since an extensive
behavioural literature suggests that people must be familiar
with faces before they can easily extrapolate over different
views (e.g., Hancock, Bruce, & Mike Burton, 2000).
At least three other fMRI studies have examined this
question of image-dependence of FFA RS, though all using
immediate repetition. Eger, Schweinberger, Dolan, and
Henson (2005) showed that FFA RS does occur across
different views of immediately repeated faces (for both
familiar and unfamiliar faces during a gender-judgment
task). Nonetheless, this RS was smaller than for repetition
of the same view, particularly for famous faces (contrary to
expectations of greater generalisation over views for famous
faces, though some suggestion of this generalisation was
found in more anterior fusiform regions). These results sug-
gest either a mixture or view-independent or view-specific
face repetitions in FFA, or that RS (for immediate repetition)
is modulated continuously by the degree of low-level visual
overlap (since different views of the same face still entail
some visual overlap). Winston, Henson, Fine-Goulden, and
Dolan (2004) compared RS for pairs of faces that were either
the same or a different person, which had either the same or
different emotional expression (while participants moni-
tored for a rare non-face target). FFA RS was sensitive to
identity but not to expression; i.e., FFA showed reduced re-
sponses to the same person even with a different expression.
Nonetheless, one could argue that images of the same face
with two different expressions are still visually more similar
to each other than are images of two different faces.
Rotshtein, Henson, Treves, Driver, and Dolan (2005)
addressed this concern by morphing between two famous
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identity but showed no evidence that it was modulated
continuously by degree of visual overlap (on the morph
continuum), suggesting that FFA RS involves higher-level
visual representations (unlike the occipital face area, which
showed sensitivity to morph distance instead).
More generally, a PubMed search for “fMRI repetition sup-
pression faces fusiform” revealed 11 papers (beyond those
reviewed above) that used intermixed designs (where repeti-
tion is unpredictable) on healthy volunteers. Many of these
studies used trials containing two stimuli that are either the
same face or two different faces, and compared these to trial
pairs consisting of a face and non-face stimulus, or to a single
face trial. Soon, Venkatraman, and Chee (2003), for example,
explored the SOA between pairs of unfamiliar faces during a
gender-judgment task. Reduced FFA responses were found for
pairs of two different faces relative to single face trials; a
category-level RS effect that decreased as SOA increased from
3 sec to 6 sec. Repetition of the same face however showed
even greater reductions, which did not interact with SOA,
suggesting additional exemplar-specific RS. Kaiser, Walther,
Schweinberger, and Kovacs (2013) used famous faces in a
gender-judgment task, where the first face was either of the
same category (e.g., female) or the same person (and same
image). FFA showed reduced responses to same category trials
(compared to trials when the first stimulus was a scrambled
faces) and further reductions still for same person trials. They
called the former effect “adaptation” and the latter effect
“priming”, but these data again suggest that FFA shows RS to
both the face category and specific face exemplar. Podrebarac,
Goodale, Van Der Zwan, and Snow (2013) reported RS to pairs
of two different, consecutive unfamiliar faces that were either
of the same versus different gender during a facial-
attractiveness task in left FFA (and a right collateral sulcus
region), again supporting idea that FFA RS can operate at the
level of face categories too.
Other studies have explored the paradigm originally
introduced by Summerfield et al. (2008), where trial-pairs like
those above are presented in blocks inwhich the proportion of
trial-pairs that contain repetitions is either high or low
(therebymanipulating the probability, and hence expectation,
of repetition). These authors found that FFA RS was greater
when repetitions were more probable (the theoretical impli-
cations of this finding are discussed later). Using this para-
digm, Kovacs, Iffland, Vidnyanszky, and Greenlee (2012) found
that RS and its modulation by repetition probability were
invariant to retinal position, arguing against low-level visual
contributions to these effects (that use the same face image).
De Gardelle, Stokes, Johnen, Wyart, and Summerfield (2013)
used the same paradigm (though with an explicit repetition-
detection task, rather than the original indirect target moni-
toring task used by Summerfield et al., 2008) and examined
responses of individual voxels. They found that while some
FFA voxels showed RS, others showed RE, and the voxels
showing these effects (at least in left FFA) were i) consistent
across runs (i.e, unlikely to reflect randomnoise), ii) correlated
with each other, and iii) showed correlated effects of repeti-
tion probability (expectation). They argued that RS and RE (at
the level of voxels) may reflect two types of expectation signal
(an issue returned to later).Ishai, Pessoa, Bikle, and Ungerleider (2004) used a sample-
matching (working memory) task for unfamiliar faces that
were either fearful or neutral, and that either matched the
sample (targets) or did not (repeated distractors). For targets,
FFA RS was greater for fearful than neutral faces, while for
repeated distractors, RS was negligible. Though the paradigm
(based on animal studies) differs somewhat from the ones
reviewed above, the results reinforce the importance of top-
down effects like task-relevance, as well as stimulus-
dependent effects like emotional valence, possibly mediated
by attention. Suzuki et al. (2011) showed that the FFA RS for
immediate repetitions of unfamiliar neutral or angry faces
was attenuated for repetition of happy faces, suggesting that
prolonged emotional/attentional processing of happy faces
counter-acts RS (though the task appeared unconstrained in
this study, increasing possible attentional differences across
conditions).
Bunzeck, Schu¨tze, and Du¨zel (2006) reported that the size
of FFA RS to unfamiliar faces repeated at short-lags did not
correlate across participants with the amount of RT priming in
a gender-judgment task (rather it was RS in prefrontal cortex
that correlated with this RT priming effect), reinforcing the
robustness of FFA RS to response factors, but leaving uncer-
tain the contribution of FFA RS to behaviour. Xue et al. (2011)
compared four consecutive repetitions with four spaced rep-
etitions of unfamiliar faces during an intentional memoriza-
tion task and found that FFA RS was reduced in the spaced
condition (which is likely to simply reflect the smaller repe-
tition lag, but could also reflect expectation). More interest-
ingly, this RS was also smaller for faces later remembered,
suggesting that RS impairs encoding into episodic memory.
Finally, Kremers et al. (2014) showed RS in FFA to short-lag
repeated presentations of an unfamiliar face superimposed
on a scene during a task that required associating the face and
scene, and that this RS correlated with hippocampal RS. They
suggested that FFA RS for these (associative) repetitions re-
flected modulation of a top-down signal from hippocampus.
Overall, it is difficult to see a clear pattern across these
studies,mainly because of the large range of stimuli, tasks and
lags employed. Nonetheless, they do suggest that FFA RS re-
flects more than low-level visual overlap, but at the same
time, that it operates at the level of both exemplars and
category (faces vs nonfaces). The studies also reinforce the
importance of modulations by visual attention, which likely
depend on the task and stimulus properties (e.g., emotional
valence), and the possible top-down influences of other brain
regions.2. Theoretical review
I am not aware of a theory that explains all of the results
reviewed above, let alone those in the larger literature on face
repetition effects. Nonetheless, it is worth considering a few
features that such a theory might have.
2.1. Facilitation (dynamical) models
Foremost is the need for a dynamic perspective. The brain is
clearly a dynamical system, in which neural activity reflects
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settles on a more stable (less energetic) “attractor” state, cor-
responding to the final interpretation/significance of that
stimulus. If this process leads to a certain degree of synaptic
change, such that the attractor for that stimulus is widened/
deepened, then stabilisation of the network is likely to occur
faster when that stimulus is repeated. This corresponds to the
“Facilitation” account discussed by Grill-Spector, Henson, and
Martin (2006).
There is some indirect evidence for this account. For
example, because the fMRI BOLD response integrates over
several sec of neural activity, a shorter duration of activity,
following repetition, will result not only in a reduced ampli-
tude of BOLD response (i.e., RS), but also an earlier peaking of
that response (under linear convolution assumptions; Fig. 3A).
Henson and Rugg (2001) binned every sec the trial-averaged
FFA fMRI data from the famous conditions of the fame-
detection task of Henson et al. (2002), and fit an haemody-
namic response function (HRF) that was explicitly parame-
terized by its amplitude, peak delay and onset delay (Fig. 3B).
Across participants, there was evidence that repeated pre-
sentations had both a smaller peak amplitude and an earlier
peak latency than initial presentations, but no difference in
onset latency (Fig. 3B). This is consistent with repetition
causing a shorter duration of neural activity.
Another piece of evidence for facilitation was reported by
Henson (2012). This involved a singular-value decomposition
of the ERP data in Henson, Wakeman, Litvak, and Friston
(2011), in which faces were repeated immediately (with an
SOA of approximately 3 sec). The first spatial mode resembled
the topography of the N170, broadly consistent with a fusi-
form source, while the first temporal mode suggested that the
evoked response for repeated presentations was a com-
pressed version of that for initial presentations (Fig. 3C).
Formal analysis, which involved stretching the time-axis of
the initial response until it best fit that of the repeated
response, revealed a “stretch factor” that was significantly less
than 100% across participants. This is again consistent with
repetition accelerating the neural dynamics. Note also that an
empirical consequence of this continuous dynamical
perspective is that the effects of repetition will be smaller and
therefore harder to detect the earlier they occur with respect
to stimulus onset, which may explain why many ERP studies
fail to detect repetition effects on early responses like the
N170.
One problem with this dynamic account is that little evi-
dence has been reported for repetition affecting the latency
of single-cell responses, e.g., in terms on onset of firing rate
histograms (Kar & Krekelberg, 2016; Vogels, 2016). It is
possible that analyses of the duration of such histograms
might reveal repetition effects; or that the human extracra-
nial ERP results reflect the summation of local-field potentials
across multiple neurons, including ones less selective than
those typically selected for recording. Note also that there are
other mechanisms, apart from accelerated dynamics, that
are likely to contribute to the RS recorded by fMRI, such as
the fatigue and sharpening mechanisms of Grill-Spector et al.
(2006). Indeed, impressive work has tried to separate the fa-
tigue and sharpening models in terms of the tuning curves of
the underlying neuronal populations, both with fMRI(Weiner, Sayres, Vinberg, & Grill-Spector, 2010) and single-
cell recording (Verhoef, Kayaert, Franko, Vangeneugden, &
Vogels, 2008). Nevertheless, these mechanisms are not
incompatible with concurrent dynamic changes; indeed,
future modelling work may reveal that fatigue, sharpening,
facilitation (and synchrony, Gotts, Chow, & Martin, 2012) are
all consequences of synaptic change within recurrent neural
networks.
2.2. A specific predictive coding model
One specific example of a recurrent neural network model is
the predictive coding model developed by Friston (2005). Ac-
cording to this hierarchical model of perception, neurons at
one level of the hierarchy receive predictions from higher
levels, and feed forward the difference between these pre-
dictions and the input from layers below e the “prediction
error”. The synapses between levels then adjust so as to
reduce prediction error in future. As a consequence, when a
stimulus is repeated, the prediction error is reduced more
rapidly (Fig. 3D), as the whole hierarchy settles into an inter-
pretation of that stimulus. Because the feed-forward neurons
tend to be the large pyramidal neurons in superficial layers of
the cortex that produce the signal detected by EEG/MEG, these
techniques are assumed to measure the prediction error
directly.
Henson and Friston (2006) produced a toy version of this
model with two levels, in which the FFA was mapped to the
lower level, while the upper level was assumed to reflectmore
anterior temporal regions with more abstract face represen-
tations (e.g., of identity). Simulations showed that repeating a
stimulus produced reduced responses in both layers, but this
reduction was greater and later in the lower level than in the
upper level (Fig. 3E). This prediction could be tested with
concurrent recording from neurons in two cortical areas
assumed to map to different levels of the visual processing
pathway. Future work could also specify more complex
dynamical interactions, to test ideas about synchrony of firing
(Gotts et al., 2012) and to fit data on changes in oscillatory
power, e.g., in high-frequency gamma range (Gruber&Mu¨ller,
2002).
2.3. A digression on expectation versus prediction
Before closing, it is important to distinguish the concept of
“prediction” assumed by the type of models above, and the
concept of “expectancy” that has received much recent in-
terest in fMRI and single-cell studies of RS. Summerfield et al.
(2008) showed that fMRI RS in FFA was greater when the
probability of repetition was higher. They interpreted this in
terms of stronger predictions, resulting in greater reduction of
prediction error when repetition did occur. However, single-
cell studies have not yet found this interaction between RS
and repetition probability; finding instead RS regardless of
repetition probability (Kaliukhovich & Vogels, 2011; while
other human fMRI studies have shown that the probability
effect is contingent on attention, Larsson & Smith, 2012). One
possibility is that repetition probability induces a conscious
expectancy that arises outside the visual processing pathway,
e.g., from prefrontal cortex. This is different from the
Fig. 3 e Example dynamical perspectives. Predictions of simple linear convolution models for fMRI (A) and fit to FFA fMRI
data from Henson et al. (2002) (B). First spatial (left) and temporal (right) modes of ERP data averaged across participants
from Henson (2012) (C). Schematic of predictive coding model (D) with two levels, using notation from general linear model,
where y ¼ input to a level, Y ¼ predictions from later above; X ¼ forward weight matrix; X¡1 ¼ backward weight matrix;
b ¼ activity in higher level; e ¼ (residual) prediction error. The weights X and X¡1 are more accurate after first
presentation, reducing e during second presentation. Results of a simulation (E) from Henson and Friston (2006), where
PSTH ¼ peristimulus histogram; ATL ¼ anterior temporal lobe; a.u. ¼ arbitrary units; yellow circles indicate repetition
effects.
c o r t e x 8 0 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 7 4e1 8 4182perceptual predictions following synaptic change within the
visual pathway discussed above: Expectancy might reflect a
general top-down bias/workingmemory signal indicating that
the previous stimulus is likely to be seen again, whereasperceptual predictions arise automatically from content-
specific synaptic changes following every stimulus
encounter, which are part of normal perceptual adjustment/
learning. It is possible that non-human primates do not
c o r t e x 8 0 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 7 4e1 8 4 183develop such strong expectancy in the paradigms used for
single-cell recording, explaining why no modulation by repe-
tition probability is found. Importantly however, the lack of a
probability-by-repetition interaction does not falsify a pre-
diction error account of the type described above, which
would predict a main effect of repetition regardless of the
probability of repetition.3. Conclusion
My personal journey, like the journeys of many others
contributing to this special issue, has revealed that repetition
suppression (RS), even for a single stimulus-type (faces) in a
single brain area (FFA), is a complex phenomenon that is likely
to have multiple physiological causes, operating under
different conditions and at different time-scales. Nonetheless,
we have now developed a considerable database of empirical
findings, not only from human fMRI and EEG/MEG, but also
from single-cell recording. It seems important to me that
future work uses computational models that simulate both
firing rates and local field potentials across populations of
neurons, in order to relate these different types of data. These
models may reveal that concepts like fatigue, sharpening and
prediction error are all reflections of the same neural princi-
ples.Whatever the details of thesemodels, they cannot ignore
the fact that the brain is a dynamical system, in which repe-
tition effects have temporal as well as spatial dimensions.Acknowledgements
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